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STATE OF UTAH 
BASIN FLYING SERVICE, 
Protestant-Appellant, 
vs. 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, 
DINALAND AVIATION, INC., and 
FLAMING GORGE FLYING SER-
VICE, 
Respondents-Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE DINALAND AVIATION, INC. 
This brief is submitted on behalf of the appellee 
Dinaland Aviation, Inc., hereinafter referred to as 
"Dinaland". The Public Service Commission of the 
State of Utah shall be referred to as the "Commission", 
Flaming Gorge Flying Service shall be referred to as 
"Flaming Gorge" and appellant Basin Flying Service 
shall be referred to as "Basin". 
N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
This proceeding was instituted by appellant to ob-
tain judicial review of the conclusion and Order of the 
Case No. 
13735 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
Commission that it does not have jurisdiction to regulate 
the nonscheduled air charter service provided by Dina-
land. 
D I S P O S I T I O N BY T H E 
P U B L I C S E R V I C E COMMISSION OF U T A H 
On the 13th day of September, 1973, in Investiga-
tion Docket No. 151, the Commission caused to have 
served on John A. Gardner, President of Dinaland, 
an Order To Show Couse (R. 23-25) relating to the 
Commission's investigation of Dinaland's operations 
and practices. 
Case No. 6943 involved an application filed on Oc-
tober 23, 1973, to transport passengers and property, 
serving on-call over irregular routes, from and to all 
points and places in the State of Utah as well as various 
points outside of the State of Utah, with fixed base 
operations at the Vernal, Utah airport (R. 31-41). In 
it's application, Dinaland also claimed: 
"***That the charter service proposed by the 
applicant is not subject to regulation by the 
Public Service Commission of Utah and that 
said Commission should so find." 
A consolidated hearing in Investigation Docket No. 
151 and Case No. 6943 was conducted on December 13, 
1973. At the hearing, it was established that: (1) on the 
eighth day of March, 1973, Dinaland provided a non-
scheduled charter flight from Vernal, Utah, to Salt 
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Lake City, Utah (R.14); (2) Dinaland does not pro-
vide any scheduled service (R.16); and, (3) Dinaland 
holds a license from the State Aeronautics Division, 
State of Utah and a Federal Aviation Administration 
License authorizing the carriage of passengers and 
cargo freight to any point in the Continental United 
States, Canada and Mexico, single and multi engine 
(R.16). 
At the conclusion of the hearing, Dinaland's certi-
fication application was continued without date and 
the Commission took the matter of Dinaland's March 
8, 1973 intrastate flight under advisement. The question 
squarely before the Commission was whether Dinaland's 
service of March 8, 1973, was illegal because the same 
was conducted without an intrastate Certificate of Pub-
lic Convenience and Necessity issued by the Commis-
sion. 
By it's Report and Order issued April 25, 1974 
(R. 105-112), the Commission held: 
"We therefore conclude that this Commission 
does not have jurisdiction to regulate the ser-
vice provided by respondent, Dinaland Avia-
tion, Inc., on March 8th, 1973 and that this 
proceeding should be dismissed with preju-
dice." (R. 109). 
Appellant's Petition for Reconsideration was de-
nied by the Commission's Order of May 30, 1974. (R. 
119). 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Dinaland seeks an affirmation of the Commissions 
Report and Order. 
S T A T E M E N T OF F A C T S 
Dinaland conducts a fixed base operation at the 
Vernal Municipal Airport, Uintah County, Utah pur-
suant to a five year lease from the City of Vernal and 
Uintah County with a five year option renewal (R. 11). 
A 60' by 80' heated metal hanger building that includes 
an office and pilot's lounges has been constructed by 
Dinaland (R. 13): Exhibits 1 & 2) and Dinaland's 
schedule of equipment includes a Cessna 150, Cessna 206 
and a leased twin engine Cessna 310 (R. 13). 
The services provided by Dinaland include a Fed-
eral Aviation Administration approved flight training 
program, a fuel service, including a line of jet fuel, and 
a charter air taxi service over irregular routes at irregu-
lar times on an on-call basis (R. 15). 
Contrary to appellant's assertion that Dinaland 
conducts a "haphazard" operation, the testimony clearly 
established that Dinaland conducts it's business pur-
suant to the highest standards of it's indurstry. A non-
scheduled aircraft carrier such as Dinaland operates 
without established routes or fixed time schedules and 
may refuse service for various reasons, including adverse 
weather conditions and unavailability of adequate equip-
ment because of maintenance problems or prior com-
mitments (R. 16-17). 
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Appellant's contention that the Commission begged 
the issue by leaving the final resolution of the matter 
to this Court is an inaccurate characterization of the 
Commission's Report and Order. As previously noted, 
the Commission expressly found and concluded that it 
did not have jurisdiction to regulate the intrastate air 
charter service rendered by Dinaland (R. 109). The 
Commission did recognize that the parties represented 
at the hearing did advise the Commission, "***that re-
gardless of our decision herein, the party against whom 
we decided adversely would appeal our decision to the 
Utah Supreme Court for a final determination of this 
issue." (R. 109). This recognition, however, did not 
constitute a mere certification of the question to this 
Court for resolution. Instead, an administratively final 
order has been entered and the same is now before this 
Court pursuant to the statutory provisions relating to 
judicial review. 
Dinaland's Motion to Dismiss Appeal was denied 
by this Court on October 21,1974. 
A R G U M E N T 
T H E COMMISSION P R O P E R L Y CON-
C L U D E D T H A T I T D O E S NOT H A V E J U R I S -
D I C T I O N TO R E G U L A T E T H E A I R CHAR-
T E R SERVICES P E R F O R M E D BY D I N A -
L A N D . 
P O I N T I 
D I N A L A N D IS NOT A COMMON 
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C A R R I E R AS T H E T E R M IS STATU-
T O R I L Y D E F I N E D . 
Appellant's initial contention under Point I of its 
brief that Dinaland is a "common carrier" is rebutted 
by reference to Section 54-2-1 (14) Utah Code An-
notated (1953, as amended). This section, as amended 
by the Utah State Legislature in 1969, defines "com-
mon carrier" as pertinent herein as: 
"***Every railroad corporation; street rail-
road corporations; automobile corporations; 
scheduled aircraft carrier (corporation); aerial 
bucket tramway corporation; express corpora-
tion ; dispatch sleeping, dining, drawing room, 
freight, refrigerator, oil, stock and fruit car 
corporations***" (Emphasis added). 
In Application of Central Airlines, Inc., 185 P. 2d 
919 (Okla., 1947), the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma 
Corporation Commission to regulate air transportation 
was challenged. The Commission contended that the 
wording, "***The term 'transportation company' shall 
include ***", did not deprive it of jurisdiction over 
businesses not expressly specified, but enlarged the defi-
nition of the term "transportation company" to include 
all business dealing with transportation. The court held 
that the term "transportation company" was general 
and the categories following the words "shall include" 
were qualifying and definitive. Because the subsequent 
categories did not specify air transporation, it was held 
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that the "Commission did not have authority to regulate 
the same." 
This same reasoning applies in determining the 
scope of the general classification "common carrier" as 
qualified by the use of the pharse "scheduled aircraft 
carrier (corporation)". The definitive use of the term 
"scheduled aircraft carrier (corporation)" necessarily 
excludes a nonscheduled air carrier from the definition. 
A consistent allegation by appellant is that Dina-
land "***persists in attributing ultra special meanings 
to flight terms such as 'nonscheduled', 'irregular routes' 
and 'irregular times'." (Brief of Appellant, page 6). 
These observations merely illustrate appellant's failure 
to comprehend the distinction between the scheduled 
airline industry and the nonscheduled charter air service 
industry. By it's very nature, a scheduled aircraft car-
rier operates on the basis of established routes, sched-
uled times, uniform tariffs and the duty to carry any 
and all for whom it has room. As previously noted, a 
nonscheduled aircraft carrier operates a charter service 
without established routes, fixed time schedules or pub-
lished tariffs and may refuse a requested service for any 
legal reason. 
Terms such as "nonscheduled", "irregular routes", 
and "irregular times" are not merely "flight terms" but 
terms that have a particular meaning in the aviation in-
dustry. This was recognized by the Legislature of the 
State of Utah when the hand written interlineation of 
the word "scheduled" was added to the amendment to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Section 54-2-1 (14) Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
amended) prior to it's adoption. 
I t is this distinction between a scheduled and non-
scheduled aircraft carrier that justifies Section 54-1-9 
Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), wherein the 
Commission, it's officers and employees, when in the per-
formance of their official duties have the right to travel 
free of charge on every common carrier. The Commis-
sion's boarding of a scheduled flight is certainly distin-
guishable from a demand directed to a nonscheduled air 
charter service to fly the Commission, it's officers and 
employees, to and from any point within the State of 
Utah, free of charge. 
Appellant attempts to expand the clear and un-
ambiguous statutory definition of "common carrier" 
and relies on cases such as Alaska Air Transport, Inc. 
vs. Alaska Airplane Charter Co., 72 F . Supp. 609 
(Alaska, 1947) Cushing et al. vs. White 101 Wash., 
172, 172 P . 229 (1918) and Travis vs. Dickey, 96 Okla-
homa 250, 222 P . 527 (1924). In each case, the court 
dealt with a regulatory scheme that did not statutorily 
define a common carrier thereby imposing on the court 
the obligation to render a judicial interpretation. The 
Legislature of the State of Utah has removed this bur-
den from this court by setting forth a clear legislative 
definition of the term "common carrier" and reliance on 
judicial interpretations is completely misplaced. 
Dinaland will not belabor this brief with a duplica-
tion of the observations and arguments set forth in the 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
brief of Flaming Gorge, but will merely reiterate the 
fact that the word "scheduled" was not in the original 
draft of the 1969 legislative amendment but was added 
by hand written interliniation prior to the adoption of 
the amendment. The Commisison properly recognized 
the clear import of this legislative history by stating: 
"We are of the opinion, however, that the Leg-
islature must have meant something by it's 
longhand, last minute, addition of the word 
'scheduled' in section 54-2-1 (14). A change of 
language of a bill during the course of its 
adoption indicates an intention to enact a pro-
vision different in effect that that called for by 
the original language, particularly where there 
are inconsistencies by amendments of bills dur-
ing the course of their consideration (citing 
authority)". (R. 109). 
P O I N T I I 
D I N A L A N D IS NOT S T A T U T O R I L Y 
R E Q U I R E D TO OBTAIN A C E R T I F I -
CATE OF P U B L I C C O N V E N I E N C E 
A N D N E C E S S I T Y FROM T H E COM-
MISSION P R I O R TO T H E R E N D I -
TION OF I N T R A S T A T E A I R CHAR-
T E R SERVICES. 
Section 54-4-1 Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
amended), concerning the jurisdiction of the Commis-
sion, provides that the Commission is vested with the 
power to supervise and regulate any "public utility" 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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within the state. Section 54-2-1 (30) Utah Code Anno-
tated (1953, as amended) provides in part: 
"the term 'public utility' includes every com-
mon carrier, gas corporation, electrical corpora-
tion, telephone corporation, telegraph corpora-
tion, water corporation, sewage corporation, 
heat corporation***" (Emphasis added). 
As previously noted, the term "common carrier" 
is definitely limited to "scheduled aircraft carrier (cor-
poration)," 54-2-1 (14) Utah Code Annotated (1953, 
as amended). The inescapable conclusion from this 
statutory scheme is that unscheduled aircraft carriers 
are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission 
because they are neither "common carriers" nor "public 
utilities". 
Appellant relies on Section 54-2-1 (29) Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended), which defines aircraft 
carriers to include every corporation and person, leassee 
and trustee, "***operating for public service for hire 
engaged in intrastate transportation of persons or prop-
erty***", and Section 54-4-25 (1) and (6) Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended), the pertinent portions 
of which provide: 
(1) No railroad corporation, ***aircraft 
carrier (corporation) ***shall henceforth 
establish or begin construction or operation 
of a ***line, route, plant, or system without 
having first obtained from the Commission a 
certificate that present or future public con-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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venience and necessity does or will require such 
construction; provided that this section shall 
not be construed to require any such corpora-
tion to secure such certificate for an exten-
sion within any city or town within which it 
shall have heretofore lawfully commenced op-
erations, or for an extension in a territory, 
either within or without a city, or town, conti-
guous to it's railroad,***not therefore served 
by a public utility of like character***that if 
any public utility in constructing or extending 
it's line, plant or system shall interfere or be 
about to interfere with the operation of the line, 
plant or system of any other public utility 
already constructed, the Commission on comp-
laint of the public utility claiming to be injur-
iously affected, may, after hearing, make such 
order and prescribe such terms and conditions 
for the location of the lines, plants, or systems 
affected as to it may seem just and reasonable." 
A contention that an intrastate air charter service 
that is neither a "common carrier" nor a "public utility" 
must obtain a Certificate of Public Convenience and 
Necessity predicated on these statutes is charged with 
several noticeable flaws in logic. First, the statute pro-
hibits the establishment, construction, or operation of a, 
«***jjne? route, plant or system****". An air charter 
service such as that rendered by Dinaland does not 
operate on established lines, routes, or systems but, 
rather, operates pursuant to the requests of a paying 
customer. For example, an air carrier may be said to 
establish a "route" when it flies a daily schedule at fixed 
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times under published tariffs of rates and charges, from 
Salt Lake City, Utah to Vernal, Utah. However, an air 
charter service may make five flights in one day from 
Salt Lake City to Vernal or it may never fly between 
those points, the destination being governed solely by 
the requirements of it's customers .Therefore, an air 
charter service does not operate or establish lines, routes 
or systems within the meaning of 54-4-25 (1) Utah 
Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
Secondly, said section consistantly uses the term 
"public utility" throughout it's content in referring to 
the corporations mentioned thereunder. Because an un-
scheduled air charter service is not a "public utility", 
the conclusion is inescapable that this section pertains 
only to those aircraft carriers operating as "common 
carriers" so as to be within the definition of "public 
utilities". 
By defining a public utility to include common 
carriers and by limiting common carriers to only sched-
uled aircraft carriers, the 1969 legislative amendment 
recognized the principle set forth in the State ex rel. 
Public Utilities Commission of Utah v. Nelson, 65 Utah 
457, 238 P. 237 (1925) wherein this Court stated at 65 
Utah 462: 
Public service, as distinguished from mere 
private service, is thus a necessary factor to 
constitute a common carrier. Such element, in 
portions of the act, is not as clearly expressed 
as might be. Nevertheless, it necessarily is im-
plied. I t is only by the presence of such factor 
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or element that the commission has power or 
authority to regulate or control such business. 
Eliminating it, its power and jurisdiction are 
gone. No one may successfully contend that 
it is competent for the Legislature to regulate 
and control in such respect a mere private busi-
ness or to declare a private business to be a 
public service or a public utility. In other 
words, the state may not, by mere legislative 
fiat or edict or by regulating orders of a com-
mission, convert mere private contracts or a 
mere private business into a public utility or 
make its owner a common carrier, (citing 
cases) So, if the business or concern is not 
public service, where the public has not a legal 
right to the use of it, where the business or 
operation is not open to an indefinite public, 
it is not subject to the jurisdiction or regula-
tion of the commission. 
An air charter or taxi service such as that performed 
by Dinaland is not open to an indefinite public as is the 
service rendered by a scheduled aircraft carrier. Air 
charter services are not obligated to provide a particular 
requested flight and may refuse to do for various rea-
sons including adverse weather conditions and unavail-
ability of particular equipment. The service is strictly 
private in nature. 
A further illustration of the distinctions between 
a public and private service and a public utility as 
against a private industry is the statutory authority of 
the Commission to supervise and regulate rates and 
charges where the activities are within the definition of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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a common carrier and/or public utility. For example, 
Section 54-3-2 Utah Code Annotated (1953), as am-
ended), provides in part: 
"Every common carrier shall file with the 
Commission, and shall print and keep open to 
the public inspection, schedules showing the 
rates, fares, charges, and classifications for the 
transportation***of persons and property. . . ." 
This same basic requirement relating to public util-
ities other than common carriers is set forth in subsection 
(2) of said section. In addition, Section 54-3-3 Utah 
Code Annotated (1953, as amended) prohibits a public 
utility from changing or altering it's published schedule 
without Commission approval and Section 54-3-6 Utah 
Code Annotated (1953, as amended), prohibits devia-
tion by common carriers from their published schedules. 
A determination by this Court that the Commission 
could exercise jurisdiction over nonscheduled air charter 
carrier would create a situation whereby the Commis-
sion would have to approve a certificate of convenience 
and necessity but would not have authority to supervise 
and regulate schedules of rates, fares, charges and classi-
fications. This was clearly not the purpose or intent of 
the statutory scheme relating to the Commission's au-
thority. 
P O I N T I I I 
COMMISSION J U R I S D I C T I O N M U S T 
B E C R E A T E D BY E X P R E S S STATU-
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TORY DELEGATION AND THE 
SAME MAY NOT BE INFERRED OR 
IMPLIED. 
As stated in Public Utilities Commission vs. Colo-
rado Motor Way, Inc., 165 Colo. 1, 437 P.2d 44 (1968), 
a t437P.2d46: 
"The Commission is a creature of statute. 
Both the power and scope of this authority 
and it's procedures are necessarily controlled 
by the Act upon which it relies." 
Additionally, in State ex rel. Public Utility Dist. 
No. 1 of Okanogan County vs. Department of Public 
Service et d., 21 Wash, 2d 201, 150 P.2d 709 (1944), 
the Court stated at 150 P.2d 713: 
"I t is well settled in this state, as elsewhere, 
that a public service commission, such as the 
Department of Public Service in this state, is 
an administrative agency created by statute and 
as such has no inherent powers, but only such 
as have been espressly granted to it by the legis-
lature or have, by implication, been conferred 
upon it as necessarily incident to the exercise 
of those powers expressly granted." 
See also 64 Am.Jur.2d Public Utilities, Sec-
tion 232. 
In South Mississippi Airways et al, vs. Chicago 
and Southern Airlines et al., 26 So 2d 455, 165 A.L.R. 
906 (1946), three applications were filed by separate 
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airlines seeking certificates of public convenience and 
necessity for operation along certain designated intra-
state routes. The Court determined that a motor driven 
airplane is a motor vehicle capable of operating as a 
common carrier. "***[a]s the term 'common carrier' is 
defined." (26 So 2d 461). The Court further determined 
that the statutory regulation was limited to common 
carriers by land or water and did not include air car-
riers. In doing so, the Court observed at 26 So 2d 462: 
"There is nothing in our statutes wherein reg-
ulation of airplanes as common carriers can be 
made to fit. Certainly, any public service com-
mission to whom such regulations were com-
mitted would be required to follow rules deal-
ing with landing fields, runways, control tow-
ers, beams, hangers, radio communications, 
clearances, types, sizes and capacities of air-
planes, restrictions on safety of flights by 
ceilings, qualifications of pilots, and other 
matters pertaining particularly to airplane 
operations. These and many other essentials 
and incidents of aeronautical operations do not 
fit existing legislation regulating facilities and 
operation of common carriers by land and 
water even where motor driven. Only over such 
common carriers has jurisdiction been expres-
sly committed to the Public Service Commis-
sion by the Legislature, the sole source of it's 
powers." 
As previously noted, the Utah regulatory scheme 
does not include nonscheduled air charter carriers within 
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the definition of a common carrier. Even if this was the 
case, the statutes are completely devoid of any delega-
tion of regulatory powers to the Commission relating 
to matters peculiar to the aircraft industry. The failure 
of the legislature to so provide is further evidence of a 
legislative intent to exclude nonscheduled air charter 
carriers from Commission regulation. 
This is not to say that carriers such as Dinaland 
are completely free from regulation. Minimum require-
ments have been adopted by the Utah State Aeronautics 
Commission pursuant to the Utah Aeronuatical Regula-
tory Act (Title No. 2, Charter 4, Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, as amended). The Board has adopted re-
quirements that adequately provide for the welfare and 
safety of those utilizing nonscheduled air charter services 
and Dinaland has complied with these standards and has 
been granted the appropriate license. 
The Commission's jurisdiction and authority to re-
gulate and control the activities of nonscheduled air 
charter carriers such as Dinaland should be the result 
of a clear expression of a legislative intent. As stated 
by this court in Williams vs. Public Service Commission, 
21 Utah 2nd 155, 442 P.2d 920 (1968) at 21 Utah 2nd 
156: 
"The Legislature shortly will meet. That is 
the foundation of administrative authority, and 
we leave it to that body under our tripartite 
system to clarify any obfuscation that seems 
to exist in the minds of some interested parties. 
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With a few words, the Legislature, with appro-
priate implementing language surely could 
make freight cars and boats, highways and 
waterways analagous if it intents such a con-
clusion." 
CONCLUSION 
Dinaland respectfully submits that the Report and 
Order of the Commission under date of April 25, 1974, 
wherein the Commission concluded that the present 
statutory scheme did not confer in the Commission 
jurisdiction to supervise and regulate nonscheduled air 
charter and taxi services such as those performed by 
Dinaland, should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted 
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